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The percentage of the world’s population living in urban 
areas will increase from 50% in 2008 to 70% (4.9 billion) in 
2025. Crowded urban areas in developing and industrial-
ized countries are uniquely vulnerable to public health cri-
ses and face daunting challenges in surveillance, response, 
and public communication. The revised International Health 
Regulations require all countries to have core surveillance 
and response capacity by 2012. Innovative approaches 
are needed because traditional local-level strategies may 
not be easily scalable upward to meet the needs of huge, 
densely populated cities, especially in developing countries. 
The responses of Mexico City and New York City to the ini-
tial appearance of inﬂ  uenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
during spring 2009 illustrate some of the new challenges 
and creative response strategies that will increasingly be 
needed in cities worldwide.
A
ccording to United Nations estimates, the percentage 
of the world’s population living in urban areas will 
increase from 50% in 2008 to 70% (4.9 billion persons) in 
2025. During 2007–2025, the number of cities with popu-
lation 1–5 million will increase from 382 to 524, and the 
number of megacities (>10 million population, comprising 
the core city, suburbs, and continuously settled commuter 
areas) will increase from 19 to 27. Of the 27 megacities, 
16 will be in Asia, 4 in Latin America, 3 in Africa, 2 in 
Europe, and 2 in North America. Currently, 1 in 25 persons 
lives in a megacity; in Latin America, the ratio is 1 in 7. 
In central Tokyo, the population density is 5,847 persons/
km2 (1). Cities are increasing in developing countries and 
often have slums that lack basic services (2). The accel-
erating global trend toward megacities is a new paradigm 
of human existence and poses profound public health chal-
lenges. New approaches for surveillance, preparedness, and 
response will be needed because current strategies may not 
be easily scalable upward to address huge, densely popu-
lated areas, especially in developing countries.
In 2008, the World Health Organization (WHO) In-
ternational Health Regulations (IHR) Coordination Depart-
ment, in collaboration with Lyonbiopole (Lyon, France), 
held a consultation, Cities and Public Health Crises (1). 
Consultants stated that WHO and national guidance does 
not always adequately address the challenges their cities 
face, and they could learn much from each other. This ar-
ticle summarizes these challenges, illustrated by the initial 
appearance of inﬂ  uenza A pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
during spring 2009 in Mexico City, Mexico, and New York 
(NYC), New York, USA (metropolitan area populations 20 
million and 19 million, respectively). These megacities 
may not be representative of cities in low-income coun-
tries, which face more daunting problems.
A Tale of 2 Megacities: Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, 
Spring 2009
Mexico City
National surveillance detected an atypical increase in 
inﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI) in mid to late February 2009 and 
a further increase in early to mid April. Anecdotal reports 
in April of increased hospitalizations of previously healthy 
young adults with severe pneumonia led to active surveil-
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lance in 23 hospitals in Mexico City and identiﬁ  cation of 47 
such cases. Patient samples showed nonsubtypeable inﬂ  u-
enza A, identiﬁ  ed on April 23 as a novel inﬂ  uenza A virus 
of subtype H1N1. The Mexico City response was based on 
early adaptation of a pandemic inﬂ  uenza preparedness plan 
that had been developed for a virus originating abroad. Af-
ter an expert meeting convened by the secretary of health, 
given the uncertain potential health impact, the president 
of Mexico invoked emergency powers; on April 24, com-
munity mitigation measures were implemented in Mexico 
City and the neighboring state of Mexico (3–7). These 
measures were announced and coordinated by the federal 
government, with participation of state authorities. The ob-
jective was to decrease transmission; elements included an 
intensive mass media campaign to inform the population 
about inﬂ  uenza, promote personal and environmental hy-
giene, request that sick persons stay home, and implement 
social distancing measures. Persons with ILI were encour-
aged to seek prompt medical care. Early in the epidemic, 
the federal government released antiviral drugs from the 
national strategic reserve and controlled their distribution. 
Ill persons and their close contacts had access to this medi-
cation free of charge. During the spring outbreak, an es-
timated 150,000 cases of ILI with 3,312 hospitalizations 
occurred in metropolitan Mexico City (H. Lopez-Gatell, 
pers. comm.).
Following the Mexican Pandemic Plan, a program 
of social mobilization was implemented through a multi-
faceted mass media saturation campaign featuring visual 
representations and a previously developed and tested mes-
sage icon, Promi, to address Mexico City’s heterogeneous 
population and literacy rates (Figure 1). The private sec-
tor, including pharmacy chains, food stores, and cellular 
telephone companies, helped deliver health messages. The 
Mexican telephone company (Telmex) assembled a call 
center that received >5 million calls. Novel communica-
tion strategies included text messaging and mass emails; 
information from the Ministry of Health was transmit-
ted through >140 million text, 60 million printed, and 18 
million email messages. Multilingual health information 
materials also were provided to all international travelers 
entering and exiting through Mexican ports, and departing 
travelers underwent thermal screening.
Frequent hand washing and cough etiquette were pro-
moted, and all government and private facilities open to the 
public were provided with alcohol gel and other disinfec-
tants. Because of limited water availability in some areas or 
households, alcohol gel was distributed free. A mass media 
campaign promoting a healthy distance discouraged greet-
ing others by hugging or kissing, common practice among 
Mexicans of all social strata. Military personnel distributed 
disposable surgical masks in public places; their use was 
recommended primarily for sick persons, but many healthy 
persons also wore them daily. Compliance with recommen-
dations appeared to be high, although some persons wear-
ing masks may have developed a false sense of security that 
took priority over cough etiquette and hand washing. When 
commercially available masks became scarce, some persons 
made their own, and disposal occasionally was problematic, 
resulting in littering. Over time, recommendations about 
cough and sneeze etiquette were followed least frequently.
All educational facilities were closed beginning April 
24 in Mexico City and, soon after, nationwide. Parents 
were advised to keep children at home; authorities dis-
tributed educational materials for home use. By May 11, 
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Figure 1. Sign hung on doorknobs containing information from 
the Mexican Ministry of Health promoting cough etiquette, using 
the communications icon Promi ( 3). Translation: “Wash your 
hands. Viruses are not permitted to enter here. When coughing or 
sneezing, cover your mouth with a disposable handkerchief or use 
your forearm, never your hands!”Pandemic Inﬂ  uenza as Urban Health Crisis
when educational facilities reopened, all schools had been 
thoroughly cleaned. Parents were requested to keep ill 
children home; peer pressure among parents to comply 
was high. Every day, upon arrival at school, children were 
screened for fever and respiratory symptoms. Ill children 
were sent home to receive care; return to school required 
a note from their primary healthcare provider granting 
medical clearance.
In addition to federal measures, on April 27, the mayor 
of Mexico City suspended dine-in service in all restaurants 
and similar establishments, allowing only take-out orders. 
Many restaurants simply remained closed. When affected 
businesses were allowed to reopen on May 6, social dis-
tancing measures (e.g., avoiding crowding) were encour-
aged, and hygiene measures were enforced (Figure 2). 
Grocery stores and supermarkets remained open, with ad-
ditional cashiers used to keep lines short. Persons in public 
places were advised to remain separated by at least 2 m. 
Large gatherings were cancelled or postponed, and enter-
tainment venues, e.g., movie theaters, were closed. Profes-
sional sports matches were broadcast, but stadiums were 
closed to the public. Churches and temples also remained 
closed, with religious services broadcast over radio and 
television. When normal services resumed, communion 
cups and other shared objects were wiped with hand gel 
after each use. Mass transit operated normally. Masks 
were provided for drivers and passengers and buses and 
subway cars were cleaned frequently. Mitigation measures 
were broadly accepted by the public. Occasional early dis-
crepancies between recommendations from ofﬁ  cial  and 
academic sources (e.g., regarding mask use) led to a few 
critical media reports without apparent consequence. Thou-
sands of workplaces of all sizes in Mexico City and the rest 
of the country were closed for several days, taking a huge 
toll on the economy. The government provided no ﬁ  nan-
cial compensation to businesses or workers. The economic 
impact of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in Mexico during 
the spring is estimated as >$2.3 billion (0.3% of gross do-
mestic product) (8).
Most important among the many lessons learned in 
Mexico is that preparation paid off. Although requiring ad-
aptation, the preexisting pandemic plan and planning pro-
cess facilitated intersectoral work, decision making, and 
rapid development of a public communications campaign. 
The availability of a national stockpile of antiviral drugs 
reassured the public. The participation of the secretary of 
health as the spokesman demonstrated high-level leader-
ship. Clear and transparent communication was important 
because Mexico was entering mid-term elections, and some 
politicians hypothesized that the outbreak was a farce to 
distract Mexicans.
The outbreak also enabled detection of some weak-
nesses in the Mexican health system. In Mexico, health-
care is provided by 3 major healthcare systems; thus 
compilation of epidemiologic information regarding hos-
pitalizations was complex. However, after a few days, a 
system was devised that provided the necessary consoli-
dated information. Laboratory capacity was inadequate 
for the challenges posed by the outbreak. At the onset of 
the outbreak, the Ministry of Health had no state-level 
laboratories with capabilities for inﬂ  uenza molecular diag-
nostics; all molecular diagnosis was centralized at the Na-
tional Epidemiological Reference Laboratory in Mexico 
City. The Ministry of Health rapidly improved the national 
laboratory network and Mexico has now 28 laboratories 
(1 in nearly every state) with PCR molecular diagnostic 
capabilities. Although having a pandemic plan was use-
ful, operationalizaton of the plan was less smooth. For 
example, procedures existed to close schools, but criteria 
for reopening them and the ability to reassure parents that 
reopened schools were safe did not.
NYC
Emergency preparedness planning in NYC accelerated 
after the World Trade Center and anthrax attacks of 2001 
and in anticipation of an inﬂ  uenza pandemic. Novel syndro-
mic surveillance systems monitor visits to hospital emer-
gency departments, calls to emergency medical services, 
pharmacy sales, worker absenteeism, and outpatient clinic 
visits. For example, information is collected electronically 
for ≈90% of daily patient visits from 77% of emergency de-
partments. Patients’ age, sex, home postal code, and chief 
complaint, but not names, are transmitted daily to the NYC 
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, where proto-
cols identify and follow up signals that suggest increased 
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Figure 2. A reopened restaurant in Mexico City, Mexico, illustrating 
mask use by the person greeting entering customers and a hand 
hygiene dispenser that all entering customers were required to use, 
May 2009. Photo courtesy of Carlos del Rio.POLICY REVIEW
community illness. During spring 2009, these systems were 
essential for real-time monitoring of the pandemic in NYC, 
e.g., documenting large increases in children with ILI seek-
ing care at emergency departments) and for tracking its 
spread throughout the city from 1 school where it apparently 
was ﬁ  rst introduced and ampliﬁ  ed (9). Additional systems 
collect etiologic information from, for example, virologic 
studies on samples of outpatients and hospitalized patients 
with ILI. However, the ﬁ  rst indication to the health depart-
ment of the outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus came 
from a school nurse telephoning a report of increased ILI 
at a single school. Subsequent surveillance and telephone 
surveys indicated ≈750,000–1 million persons in NYC had 
ILI during the spring outbreak (10).
When the ﬁ  rst cases were conﬁ  rmed, an extensive pub-
lic communication campaign was implemented through 
Ready New York, a preexisting program of the NYC Ofﬁ  ce 
of Emergency Preparedness (11). The program includes 
outreach to ethnic populations and translation into many 
languages. The principal messages were 1) wash hands 
thoroughly and frequently with soap and water; 2) avoid 
contact with persons who are obviously sick; and 3) if you 
get sick with any cold or inﬂ  uenza, stay home from work or 
school, and avoid contact with others as much as possible
During the epidemic peak, the mayor and health com-
missioner held frequent press conferences in English and 
Spanish. A NYC government information hotline (311) 
previously had been established and featured live operators 
24/7, with 98% of calls answered within 30 seconds. Dur-
ing the spring outbreak of pandemic (H1N1) 2009, ≈54,000 
calls to 311 about inﬂ  uenza and a smaller health depart-
ment hotline were answered. An electronic health alert net-
work and conference calls provided messages to healthcare 
providers.
Aside from the public messages, community miti-
gation measures focused on selective closure of schools. 
Household contacts of case-patients were not quarantined, 
businesses were not closed, and public gatherings were not 
cancelled unless they involved closed schools. School clo-
sures were decided on an individual basis (known as “reac-
tive” closures, based on visits for ILI to the school health 
nurse and on other factors, such as the ability of students 
to comply with respiratory hygiene) rather than “preemp-
tively” (i.e., before cases in the school but with reports of 
cases in other schools in the subdistrict or district). Approx-
imately 50 schools closed, for ≈1 week each.
The NYC emergency stockpile of antiviral drugs was 
not used because normal distribution channels sufﬁ  ced. 
Occasional reports of spot shortages required rapid inves-
tigation and highlighted the need for close communication 
with private distributors. If the stockpile had been needed, 
antiviral drugs would have been distributed to community 
health centers, public clinics, and hospitals. 
Distribution of vaccine for pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in 
NYC will depend on indications for use, availability, and 
urgency of administration. Vaccine will be prioritized for 
high-risk populations (12). Mass vaccination campaigns will 
use 200 point-of-distribution sites developed to meet pos-
sible needs for anthrax prophylaxis, e.g., school buildings 
throughout the city that each could serve ≈40,000 persons.
Problems included basing decisions on a pandemic se-
verity index because, at the pandemic onset, its case-fatal-
ity ratio was uncertain. Despite previous planning, several 
school dismissal issues had never been entirely resolved, 
including the objectives of closure in a less severe pandem-
ic (i.e., to protect high-risk students, all students, families; 
to slow community transmission; to allay public fears). The 
effectiveness of school closure in meeting these objectives 
was uncertain, as was the extent to which beneﬁ  ts justiﬁ  ed 
the secondary impact, including interrupting the academic 
program, parental work loss, and disruption of services 
provided at school (e.g., free breakfast and lunch to chil-
dren from low-income families, therapy for students with 
special needs).
Operational questions included criteria for school dis-
missal and reopening and difﬁ  culties in monitoring ILI and 
even absenteeism rates among students. Absenteeism data 
were often unavailable to the health department until mid-
afternoon, relatively late to notify parents about closure de-
cisions for the next school day. Instructions were not given 
for children to remain at home, and some may have recon-
gregated elsewhere, such as in public libraries, while their 
parents were at work (13). News of school closures in NYC 
led to questions from parents in suburban jurisdictions 
about why their schools remained open, even though they 
had no known cases. Individual school closings showed the 
interconnectedness between schools, such as when siblings 
or neighbors attended different ones. The issue of worker 
or business compensation for lost time from work to care 
for ill children remains difﬁ  cult. On the basis of this experi-
ence, in the 2009–10 school year, NYC is urging parents to 
keep sick children home and emphasizing infection control 
at school but will close a school only as a last resort. Clo-
sure decisions will be made on an individual basis, taking 
into account whether infection control practices could be 
improved and whether a high percentage of students have 
high-risk medical conditions (10).
During spring 2009, emergency departments were 
overcrowded with the worried ill, despite many announce-
ments about indications for persons with ILI to seek medi-
cal care. In the fall and winter of 2009 hospitals are pre-
pared to open additional nonemergency ILI care sites (e.g., 
at primary care clinics). A new 1-stop inﬂ  uenza Web portal 
provides information, as well as locations of clinical sites, 
and a call center staffed by nurses accessed through the 311 
hotline provides guidance to persons with ILI (10).
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In the city jail, cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 led to 
screening and control measures. These included isolation 
and cohorting of ill prisoners, and quarantine of those who 
had been exposed to them, to limit the spread of infection 
in the prison and court systems.
Health department stafﬁ  ng to meet surge needs posed 
challenges, including accessing and training staff from 
other parts of the health department, especially physicians, 
and the need to ensure staff time off to prevent burnout. 
Keeping policies and press releases consistent in the face of 
changing science and policies required constant attention. 
Internet survey instruments were effectively used to col-
lect epidemiologic data, as in the initial high school student 
outbreak (9).
Issues for Cities
The experiences from the response to the emergence 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in Mexico City and NYC 
highlighted several challenges raised at the WHO consul-
tation (1). These include response coordination, surveil-
lance and monitoring of illness trends, disease contain-
ment and mitigation, delivery of countermeasures, and 
public communication.
Response Coordination
Multiple government agencies serve large urban areas. 
Citizens frequently live, work, attend school in, and com-
mute through different jurisdictions. Different political par-
ties may control national, state or provincial, suburban, and 
city governments. Fringe groups or gangs may effectively 
control some areas. Incident or uniﬁ  ed command systems 
can be useful approaches to crisis coordination (14,15). In 
Mexico City and NYC, advance planning, political leader-
ship at the highest levels, and collaboration among public 
health and emergency management agencies were particu-
larly important.
Coordination with the private sector often is not well 
established. Businesses can assist, notably by providing 
health messages and enabling infectious workers to remain 
home (16). Large companies may have contacts with city 
leaders, but most are small to medium-sized enterprises 
with which coordination may be difﬁ  cult. Multinational 
corporations, common in cities, may be subject to home-
country inﬂ  uences. Response coordination with nongov-
ernment, community, and faith-based organizations also 
is important. Outbreaks in cities near international borders 
require coordination with foreign partners.
Surveillance and Monitoring of Illness Trends
Emerging challenges in cities include the vertical di-
mension (high-rise apartment blocks), travelers, and persons 
who do not have ﬁ  xed addresses or who live in slums. Novel 
approaches for illness reporting and population surveys may 
include use of cell phones and the Internet. Illness surveil-
lance ultimately depends on the organization and provision 
of health services; cities with universal health coverage will 
have important advantages (17). Outbreak recognition still 
often depends on alert clinicians; technology-based systems 
notwithstanding, a school nurse provided the ﬁ  rst indication 
of the inﬂ  uenza outbreak in NYC.
Disease Containment and Mitigation
Although not generally a problem in Mexico City or 
NYC during spring 2009, in a larger outbreak in a lower-
income country, home isolation or quarantine may be dif-
ﬁ  cult or impossible for large urban families living in 1 or 
2 rooms. Contact tracing is problematic in cities, given the 
frequency of anonymous interactions. Innovative use of 
nonhealth databases and 3-dimensional mapping, includ-
ing cell phone records and global positioning technologies, 
may be helpful but may pose privacy issues.
Decisions regarding school dismissal are problematic 
because effectiveness for disease mitigation is difﬁ  cult 
to quantify, and operational aspects often are uncertain, 
whereas the potential for societal disruption is considerable. 
Analysis is pending of the different approaches taken by 
Mexico City and NYC during spring 2009, but both have 
kept schools open during the fall, because pandemic sever-
ity has remained comparable with that in the spring. This 
approach is consistent with updated guidance from WHO 
and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(18,19). Many questions remain about how to implement 
social distancing and infection control measures in typical 
city venues, including schools, institutions of higher educa-
tion, healthcare institutions, mass transit, workplaces, and 
marketplaces. These issues are even more difﬁ  cult in devel-
oping countries. Many cities have international airports and 
may need to assist in health screening of passengers; provide 
medical care to ill passengers; and accommodate stranded 
passengers, including those in quarantine. Evacuation of a 
city poses additional public health challenges (17,20).
Delivery of Countermeasures
Rapid delivery of countermeasures, e.g., drugs and 
vaccines, is difﬁ  cult even for persons with known, ﬁ  xed 
addresses, but more so for persons in slums, travelers, un-
documented persons, and homeless persons, as well as the 
elderly and homebound. Measures taken in Mexico City 
and NYC during spring 2009 appear to have been sufﬁ  -
cient, but these systems are being tested again during the 
2009–10 winter season.
Public Communication
WHO outbreak communication guidelines empha-
size building and maintaining trust, announcing informa-
tion early, ensuring transparency, listening to the public, 
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and planning ahead (21). The generally successful pub-
lic communication campaigns of Mexico City and NYC 
incorporated these approaches. In addition to traditional 
mass media and the Internet, they also used cell phones 
and text messaging, which may offer useful models for 
developing countries. Cell phone networks may need to 
prioritize health or emergency messages, improved ro-
bustness to permit high trafﬁ  c during emergencies, and re-
dundancy in case transmitting towers are destroyed (e.g., 
in a storm). Text messages can be targeted geographically, 
e.g., to phones locked on to a particular transmitting tower 
at the time of the message. This approach could be useful 
for broadcasting localized alerts and instructions, such as 
locations of vaccination clinics.
Discussion
Cities are the norm of global development in the 21st 
century. As cities become larger and more crowded, tra-
ditional guidance for detecting and responding to public 
health crises requires innovation. Modiﬁ  ed guidance may 
be helpful, but new strategies, technologies, and metrics 
also will be needed.
Preliminary accounts of response to pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 during spring 2009 in 2 world megacities offer 
grounds for optimism. In each case, advance planning laid 
the foundation for enhanced surveillance and a generally 
effective response, made possible by an extensive public 
communications campaign and effective political leader-
ship. On the other hand, challenges emerged that would 
have been ampliﬁ  ed if the illness had been more severe or 
the period of societal disruption prolonged. Development 
of new guidance and approaches requires collaboration 
among large cities, as well as research and evaluation to 
identify best practices for cities with different resource 
levels, particularly for implementing core capacity re-
quirements under the revised IHR in a world where most 
persons now live in urban environments. The IHR require 
all countries to have core capacity for disease “surveil-
lance, reporting, notiﬁ  cation, veriﬁ  cation, response and 
collaboration activities” by 2012 (22,23). These require-
ments must be implemented in urban environments, but 
they are based on traditional public health levels (local, 
intermediate, and national), which are less clearly deﬁ  ned 
for large urban agglomerations. All national governments 
have committed themselves to IHR implementation; mu-
nicipalities must play a central role but may not be aware 
of their obligations or able to meet them. Many partners 
will be important, including businesses, which may not 
realize their stake in IHR implementation (24). Sharing 
of experience and research is needed to develop strategies 
and best practices that can be considered by similar cities 
worldwide.
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